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East European Entrants to EU: Diffidently Yours
With the resolution and speed of a turtle, the European Union is
moving its borders eastward. If the myriad promises, speeches,
treaties and signatures by European politicians are to be believed,
yet another geopolitical rearrangement is about to take place in the
middle of Europe: Part of what used to be the Soviet bloc will now
join the European Union. This geopolitical change is commonly
depicted in European newspapers as eastern Europe’s victory
march to a well deserved paradise. East European voters, it would
seem, are not so sure.
The collapse of state socialism created a situation that is quite
familiar to the states of eastern Europe from their history before state
socialism: In it, formal sovereignty is combined with extreme external
dependence and a set of institutional arrangements that curtail their
capacities to act independently. In this regard, eastern Europe seems
to manifest a tension characteristic of many post- colonial states: a
combination of formal sovereignty with very high levels of
substantive dependence on a small number of outside actors.
Since 1989, the newly sovereign states of eastern Europe have
served two main geopolitical purposes, neither of which is rooted
in their interests per se. They have provided an external zone of
geopolitical security to western Europe, and supplied inexpensive
labour and energy to some of the world’s most powerful
multinational corporations. Most active among the multina tionals
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in eastern Europe have been those headquartered in the European
Union.  Economic dependence on the EU and political-military
subservience to NATO have been the two main features of this
arrangement.  As part of the latter, virtually all states of the region
have decided by now to send troops to occupied Iraq. Poland—the
only mid-size country among the new NATO-members—is
actually in command of an entire military district in Iraq.Thirteen
years after the first parliamentary elections contested by more than
one political party in what used to be the Soviet bloc, eight states on
the eastern perimeter of the European Union—the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia—are to be transformed into a buffer zone and cheap
labour pool that is internal to the EU. The rest of the former Soviet
bloc will continue to play the role of the external buffer and
labour/energy supplier.  From 2004, the EU will have, thus, two
buffers on its eastern perimeter: one inside, one outside.
To maintain eastern Europe’s buffer-zone status and to keep
wage levels down for as long as possible even after the current
entrants’ accession to the EU, the European Union has recently
invented the formula of a “two-tiered” EU, with the second—lower
—tier reserved for the new entrants. The political elites of the
accession countries have accepted this second-class position
without much ado. Under this arrangement, the new entrants will
only be allowed to adopt the Euro with a minimum delay of five
years, if at all, and the socially most ambitious aspect of the
European Union’s integration process, the “freedom of the
movement of labour” will be conferred to the current entrants only
seven years after formal accession, i.e., if everything goes by
schedule, sometime in 2011. It is this subordinate relationship, and
specifically the low labour costs that accrue from the restrictions on
the movement of relatively highly qualified and poorly paid east
European labour within the European Union, that Günter
Verheugen, the EU’s Commissioner responsible for “eastern
enlargement”, referred to in his recent speech at Waseda University 
in Tokyo when he insisted that “the 10 acceding countries provide
one of the soundest investment climates in emerging markets.”1
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For the additional applicants currently waiting at the EU’s
doorstep (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey), formal membership will
come at least five years later, likely in the form of an even lower,
third “tier” of rights.  In sum, then, workers of the former Soviet
bloc are now promised that, if all goes well, they will have been
allowed to actually participate in the west European labour market
22 to 27 years—roughly one generation—after the collapse of state
socialism. Considering the crucial role the rhetoric of freedom, and
especially the freedom of movement, has played within the
political culture of the European Union as well as the dismantling
of the Soviet bloc, a one-generation delay is hardly a radiant
achievement. As for eastern Europe, nobody in their right mind
thought in 1989 that the EU would take an entire generation to
allow east European labour flows on its territory.
Meanwhile, the EU is taking new, ever stronger measures to
keep non-EU citizens out of its territory, offering a clear clue
regarding just what, and whom, eastern Europe is supposed to
“buffer” the territory of the European Union from. The European
Union is transforming the metaphor of the “global south” into an
ever more real, solidified geopolitical arrangement, supported by
ever more stringent border policing, more restrictive requirements
for citizenship, wider buffer zones and all the other modern
techniques of corporate exclusion that can be put to use by an
alliance between some of the most powerful states and big capital.
The European space constructed today conforms more and more to
the idea of “Fortress Europe”—a notion devised a good two
decades ago as a critique of what appeared at that time as the
frightful negative utopia of an insular “Europe”. The fast economic
and geopolitical takeover and the slow and partial inclusion of
parts of the former Soviet bloc is very much part of this process.
Add to the east European former state-socialist societies two
small island states in the Mediterranean, Malta and Cyprus, and
you have the story from the perspective of west European high
government and big capital: The European Union—a polity
currently with little over six percent of the world’s population
commanding one-fourth to one-third of the world’s gross domestic
product—is about to annex some more land. The new zone comes
with a population of some 75 million people—about 1.2 percent of
humanity—and adds approximately one percent to the EU’s share
in the global GDP. 
Inclusion of parts of eastern and southern Europe is a touchy
political process within the EU. In addition to the widespread
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“Euro-scepticism” among west Europeans in general, the accession
of the ten current entrants invokes two sets of specific political
difficulties. The public cultures of these wealthy former centres of
colonial empires invariably portray themselves as the global
vanguard of “advanced”, modern, democratic, tolerant capitalism.
In this view of the world, there is little room for the “advanced”
West’s east European post-state-socialist neighbours to be anything 
but disparaged poor relatives2 treated, at best, with condescension
and, at worst, with an attitude of “civilizational” dismissal.3 
Then there is the thorny issue of subsidies: Even the most well-
 to-do economies among the entrants—Cyprus and Slovenia—are
noticeably poorer than most of the EU (their GDP per inhabitant
figures are 74% and 70% of the EU average);4 mean income levels in
those two countries exceed only two EU-member states—Portugal
and Greece (69% and 65%, respectively).5 The accession countries’
average per capita GDP hovers below half of the EU average6 and
recent studies suggest that, even in the best of circumstances (i.e.,
assuming exceptionally steep, sustained growth in the east
European entrants), they won’t catch up with the EU mean for
another generation. It is quite widely understood in western Europe
today that the new entrants will be entitled to some subsidies and
infrastructural development funds from the EU’s central budget,
and exaggerating the magnitude of such future entitlements is one
of the simpler, most easily available tropes invoked routinely in the
west European media. Needless to say, the issue of enlargement is
rather unpopular among the public of the current European Union.
Much more interesting, accession is a rather complex political
process among the entrants as well. To the extent that membership
could indeed entail some resource transfers from Brussels to the
new members, and because the political and cultural elites of these
post-state-socialist societies have quite consistently presented
accession to the European Union as the end of the long period of
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modern European history in which the east Europeans are
portrayed as less-than-equals by their powerful neighbours to the
west, many observers have expected very high levels of approval
for accession among the population of the new entrant states.
Liberal analysts in western as well as eastern Europe have
repeatedly articulated this expectation and the region’s liberal-
 dominated, strongly pro-accession governments put the idea to
political use by inviting their publics to explicitly legitimise their
state’s efforts in achieving membership in the European Union by
democratic means. The period of March to September 2003 saw
nine7 referenda on EU-accession in the states slated to become
members of the European Union in this round. 
Bringing accession to a referendum has proven to be a risky
matter in the recent history of the European Union. Two governments
of Norway have, for instance, completed negotiations for their
state’s accession to the European Union, only to be defeated in
referenda both times. Switzerland’s voters have resisted their
government’s efforts to bring them into the European Union in
spite of the rather elementary fact of economic and political
geography that their landlocked, small state shares borders only
with the European Union. The voters of already EU-member
Denmark and Sweden have recently said no to their government’s
efforts to enter their monetary systems into the Euro-zone. (Had it
been approved, the move would have replaced the Danish and
Swedish currencies with the euro, already legal tender in twelve of
the fifteen EU-member states). Aware of the gross unpopularity of
the issue, the otherwise quite strongly pro-EU British New Labour
government has carefully avoided broaching the question of the
UK’s possible entry into the monetary union of the Euro.
There is, however, something important in common among all
of those cases; something that sets them apart from the accession
states of eastern and southern Europe. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Switzerland and the UK are all very wealthy, powerful economies.
They occupy the first, third, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth places,
respectively, in terms of their Human Development Index scores
among the world’s 175 countries included in the United Nation
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7 There have been only nine referenda because the tenth accession state,
Cyprus—a state with a de facto military standoff between the Greek and Turkish
communities supported strongly by (EU-member) Greece and (EU-member -
ship applicant) Turkey—was in no shape to hold a referendum, so the political
elites on the two sides took care of the legal work for accession through a
political compromise. 
Development Program’s most recent handbook.8 Their population’s
rejection of membership in the European Union or adopting its
currency can be, hence, seen as a strategic decision motivated largely
by their economies’ relative economic strength and their publics’
aversion to the idea of subsidising the less well-to-do members of
the European Union, let alone the new entrants. The main message
of these “no” votes is that the wealthy refuse to take responsibility
for the poor relatives.
The societies of eastern Europe and the two Mediterranean
island states occupy distinctly different global positions. Currently
they rank between 25th (Cyprus) and 50th (Latvia) in the world in
terms of their Human Development Index scores.9 It is in this
context that the accession referenda took place. The questions
posed to the voters in the referenda (variants on the basic theme of
“Do you agree that [your country] should become a member of the
European Union?”) carries, hence, a much more complicated and
ambiguous set of meanings. The following two alternatives outline
some of the most important such meanings: 
– YES: “Given that EU-based multina tionals have already acquired 
control over most property and market shares in [your country],
and that much of [your state’s] substantive sovereignty is already 
lost to the EU and NATO, do you agree that [your state] should
seek to gain a modicum of control over its own affairs, and
perhaps some say in the matter of the future of the rest of the
world, at the cost of sacrificing some of your formal sovereignty
by partaking in the large-scale economic and political might of
the European Union, even though its say will always be
insignificant?” or,
– NO: “Do you feel it is more important to voice your protest
against the geopolitical status quo tilted in favour of the EU even
at the cost of endangering [your country’s] chances to have access 
to the subsidies and development funds only offered to member
states?”
In all nine cases from Malta to Latvia, voter participation rates
exceeded the constitutional thresholds, and the valid votes
returned a majority of “yes”-es. As a result, the referenda are legally 
binding and accession will proceed as planned. 
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Development Program and Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 237–240. 
9  Ibid. 
Yet, the pro-EU east European governments are hardly
celebrating. The referendum figures have sent a subtler message to
them: Something else is happening, beyond the obvious. Table 1
lists the relevant information by referendum in chronological
order.
Table 1
Results of EU Accession Referenda; Nine States Slated to Join the EU in May 2004
state date
net
participation 
rate10
% “yes”11
strength of
mandate12
Malta13 March 8, 2003 89.82 53.60 48.14
Slovenia14 March 23, 2003 60.25 89.61 53.99
Hungary April 12, 2003 45.60 83.76 38.19
Lithuania15 May, 10–11, 2003 62.59 91.07 57.00
Slovakia16 May 16–17, 2003 52.15 92.46 48.22
Poland17 June 7–8, 2003 58.43 77.45 45.25
Czech Republic18 June 13–14, 2003 53.96 77.33 41.72
Estonia19 September 14,2003 64.06 66.83 42.81
Latvia20 September 20,2003 72.53 69.60 50.48
(Last European
Parliament elections,21
15 EU-member states)
June 10, 1999 49.50
These data suggest two basic conclusions, both rather different
from the “victory march” imagery of accession. First, and quite
striking, is that, although participation rates have varied from
45.6% (Hungary) to almost 90% (Malta), the results indicate a
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10 Proportion of eligible voters who cast a valid vote.
11 Proportion of those who said “yes” among those who cast a valid vote.
12 Valid “yes”-es as % of eligible voters.
13 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_110303.htm
#A as of July 5, 2003.
14 http://www.rvk.si/referendum/eu_nato/eng/ as of  July 5, 2003.
15 http://www.euro.lt/index.php?LangID=7?TopMenuID=127&LangID=7 as of
July 5, 2003.
16 http://www.eureferendum.sk/ as of July 5, 2003.
17 http://www.pkw.gov.pl/katalog/artykul/Obwieszczenie_o_wyniku_
_referendum_akcesyjnego.htm as of July 5, 2003.
18 http://www.volby.cz/pls/ref2003/re13?xjazyk=EN as of July 5, 2003.
19 http://www.vvk.ee/rh03/tulemus/enght.html as of September 15, 2003.
20 Participation rate: http://www.cvk.lv/cgi_bin/wdbcgiw/base/sae8dev. aktiv 
03e.vietas?aa=2&plkst=5; %“yes”: http://www.cvk.lv/cgi_bin/wdbcgiw/base/
/sae8dev.bals_rezult_03?p=2&ksk=4 as of September 20, 2003.
21 http://www.corbett_euro.demon.co.uk/convcrit.htm as of September 17, 2003.
remarkable degree of consistency across the nine cases. As Figure 1
shows, the percentage of valid “yes” votes was higher in countries
where a smaller proportion of the voters decided to vote on
accession to the EU and lower where more people went to vote. In
other words, how likely voters are to participate in a referendum on 
accession appears to be inversely related to their opinion on
accession, their country’s opportunities within the European
Union, and the EU’s geopolitical project in general. On this basis, it
is reasonable to conclude that most of the voters who did not bother 
to vote are those opposing accession. This is exactly the kind of
result you would expect if opponents of accession had a reason to
see accession as a fait accompli, a geopolitical transformation
process taking place on a grand scale, on a scale over which they do
not feel they have control. Given the speed and efficiency with
which west European capital and the west European–north
American geo-strategic alliance have established their control over
that part of the world which has just been left behind by the Soviet
geopolitical project, the east European voters’ resignation is quite
understandable.
Figure 1
Perhaps an even more devastating conclusion is to be drawn
once we observe the content of this vote. Because the European
Union requires that the member state subject itself to the
community-level laws, regulations and policies of the European
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"Yes" in the EU Referenda by Net Participation Rate,
9 Current Applicant States, March 8 to September 20, 2003
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Union, membership in the EU involves partial relinquishment of
sovereignty. The EU is widely described as a supranational polity
that embodies the “sharing and pooling” of the member states’
sovereignties. Mistrust in the EU as a sovereignty association
explained, to a large extent, the Norwegian and Swiss publics’
reluctance to approve of their government’s efforts at bringing their 
state into the Union. In the case of the east European entrants,
issues of sovereignty are quite a bit more pronounced—if for no
other reason, because of their recent experience as members of the
Soviet bloc, a supranational polity often, rightly, described as a
system that subjected the smaller states’ sovereignty to a global
geopolitical logic dictated by the USSR. The losses in substantive
sovereignty during the 14 years elapsed since the collapse of the
Soviet bloc only underline the significance of formal sovereignty.
It is of course very much an open question of political
philosophy to what extent a state or its citizens could actually have
the right to relinquish formal sovereignty—the final authority to
influence social life within a state’s territory—at all. It is possible to
argue that sovereignty is similar to property rights under capitalism
to the extent that the bundle of rights that ownership represents
includes the right to destroy, dispose of, alienate, or pass on to
others, the object of property. This particular argument would
imagine the people’s sovereignty, the foundation of republican
democracy, as basically similar to property rights.  Sovereignty
belongs to the people, so they are free to give it away.
It is possible to argue, on the other hand, that sovereignty,
particularly the sovereignty of the people is a relationship between
the political community of citizens and the state that is fundamentally
different from property ownership. According to this logic, sovereignty
is more deeply rooted than ownership, and it represents a set of
rights and obligations that is not, and ought not to be, subject to
capital’s logic of circulation. In this logic, sovereignty is not
alienable and, from this perspective, arguments that portray
sovereignty as disposable are victims to a neo-liberal fallacy based
on analogical thinking.
Be that as it may, even if we accept that “the people” ought to be
able to relinquish sovereignty in favour of the sovereignty of
another state, the idea of offering sovereignty to the European
Union poses two additional challenges, one theoretical, the other
stems from the strikingly consistent results of this year’s east and
south European referenda on accession to the EU. 
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The theoretical problem is of course the fact that, while the EU
behaves in some respects very much like a state, it is not a state itself 
in one crucial respect: It does not have an executive apparatus of its
own. For executing its output in legal and regulatory materials, it
relies on an intricate web of complex institutional arrangements,
including the executive apparatuses of its member states as well as
various international organizations and foreign actors. Therefore,
relinquishment of sovereignty to the EU means a very peculiar kind 
of transaction, where the sovereignty of the state is transferred,
partly, to a supra-state polity (the EU) that has no independent
capacity to act—i.e., no sovereignty that is specifically its own—
at all.
Then, finally, there is the empirical problem of the nine
referenda. Even if we agree for a moment that it is possible for the
voters of a state to affirm their government’s actions in passing on
parts of their formal sovereignty to the European Union, that
position still leaves open the question of how they can do so.  One
sane idea is that, in order to avoid constitutional crises, institutional 
instability and general political paralysis, that decision had better
be supported by a convincing majority of the voters. Conventional
wisdom suggests that it would be reasonable to expect a qualified
majority—say, two-thirds of the eligible voters—to support a
decision of such historic magnitude.  Such qualified majority would 
be required, for instance, if the parliaments of the newly independent
states of eastern Europe were to change or amend their Constitution. 
Of course, the logistical difficulties raised by referenda are several
magnitudes bigger than what parliamentary votes involve: It is
much more difficult to secure a convincing margin of support to
any measure via a referendum than through a vote in parliament.
Yet, it can be argued that, given the implications of the decision—after
all, giving away parts of sovereignty not only concerns the heart of
legitimate authority; it is also an irreversible step—amply justify
such stringency. Viewed from this angle, a simple numerical
majority—fifty percent of the eligible voters plus one vote—is a
rather relaxed standard for a decision.
The numbers in the rightmost column in Table 1 represent the
numerical strength of the mandate obtained in each of the nine
recent referenda on accession to the European Union. (The strength
of the referendum’s mandate is computed by multiplying the
proportion of valid votes cast—as a percentage of the number of
those eligible to vote—by the proportion of valid “yes” votes.)  
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The results are, clearly, dismal. Six of the nine referenda failed to
produce a mandate strong enough to pass even the most relaxed
criterion above (fifty percent plus one vote), and none of the nine
referenda returned mandates that would even approximate the
two-thirds qualified majority of eligible voters. Although it is true
that the strength-of-mandate figures are by and large comparable
to the voter participation rate in the last EU-elections (see the last
row in Table 1), the stakes of the two votes are, clearly, different.
The three states where the strength of the mandate passes the
more relaxed criterion—Lithuania (57%), Slovenia (53.99%) and
Latvia (50.48%)—are all products of the dissolution of the region’s
two large multiethnic federal states, the USSR and Yugoslavia.
None of them has had a substantial modern history of independent
statehood before the collapse of state socialism, and all three have
been imagined by their nationalist elites, correctly, as /1/ having a
much greater chance of becoming members of the EU “alone” than
together with the rest of their federal states, and /2/ as benefiting
tremendously from membership in the European Union in terms of
being able to prevent the re-establishment of the federal states from
which they had just seceded.  In this sense, the over-fifty percent
strong mandates are to be read at least partly as acts of political
catharsis completing the divorce of those seceded states from the
USSR and Yugoslavia. 
In sum, large-scale geopolitical rearrangements have created a
highly contradictory situation in eastern Europe. On the one hand,
the EU-accession referenda are formally valid and binding; on the
other, they have lent very weak political support to policies of
accession. The tensions arising from the co-presence of, and interplay
between, the two have produced a pervasive sense of uncertainty
and diffidence in eastern Europe today.
Does this mean that one should expect unrest, protest and
anti-EU street politics in eastern Europe? Not necessarily. What it is
most likely to produce is an unhappy, frustrated accession, marked
by pervasive mistrust and resentment. As a result, EU-related
politics within the accession states, and, as a consequence, the new
member states’ behaviour within the EU’s decision-making bodies,
is likely to be somewhat erratic, unpredictable and occasionally
self-contradictory. Irony, self-distancing and a mixture of
cooperation and foot-dragging will most likely characterise their
behaviour.
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Because of their long historical experience in serving as externally
dependent buffers with a deeply injured sense of sovereignty,
squeezed among four land-based empires—the Habsburg, Ottoman,
Russian  and Prussian “unions”—the east European states’ political 
cultures is quite well adopted to the situation of in-between-ness
and forced subservience. History has taught them advanced skills
to manage ambiguity of interests, multiple alliances, contradictory
pressures and arbitrariness. The confusing message sent by the 
accession referenda fits those historical patterns very tightly.
Source: Polski Przegl d Dyplomatyczny, 
vol. 3, No. 6 (16), November–December, 2003, pp. 51–68
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